Modem treatment of long-run (U-shaped) cost curves developed from reactions to Sraffa's criticisms of Marshall. He argued that internal (dis)economies were incompatible with partialequilibrium analysis under perfect competition. Pigou concurred and drew L-shaped cost curves; Viner realized that this made firm size indeterminate and industry output volatile. Using Austin and Joan Robinson's analyses, Stigler justified rising costs/supply, determinacy, and stability by irrational entrepreneurs enduring coordination failure and by factor price changes. We conclude that consistency requires constant costs but firm employment, output, and factor incomes remain theoretically indeterminate. It becomes likely that large firms will undermine perfect competition.
Introduction
The short-run U-shaped cost curves of economics textbooks have been the subject of a growing literature, suggesting that firm costs are constant over a wide range before they rise (Larson 1991; Maxwell 1965; Yordon 1992) .1 Using Machlup's (1952) distinction and building on Beattie's framework (1988), Larson (1991) has shown that, if factors are indivisible in acquisition but divisible in use, firms will choose fixed input proportions at output levels below full-capacity utilization. This implies constant and equal marginal and average factor productivity as well as constant and equal marginal and average variable costs. With the majority of the real-world cases falling in this category, Larson has suggested that short-run constant costs require "reworking of many aspects of traditional economic theory" (p. 473).
In this paper, we focus on a related aspect of textbook analysis, the prevailing view that unit that "had a fairly long life, and fair success, which [was] managed with normal ability, and which [had] normal access to the economies, external and internal" (Marshall 1920 , p.
265).
Marshall's analysis has been touted for its richness (see, e.g., Abouchar 1990 ). Perhaps because of it, his treatment of the relationships among cost, output, and price lacked precision (Viner 1931, p. 199) . Diminishing returns described both short-run and long-run phenomena. In addition, empirical, historical, and analytical costs were treated at the same level, and shifts in and movements along cost curves were conflated. The interdependence was graphically analyzed through two curves, the supply price and the marginal supply price. Pigou defined the supply price of a given quantity of output as the "price which tends to call out the production of that quantity annually"; at this price, total revenue and total costs were equal (Pigou 1912 , p. 174). Marginal supply price was defined as "the difference between the aggregate expenses of the annual production of x units and of (x + Ax) units respectively" (p. 176). The two curves coincided only when constant returns were prevalent. Under increasing returns, supply price was higher than marginal supply price; an increase in the output of the individual firms could lead to external economies of the type specified by Marshall (1920) that reduced the cost of production for the industry as a whole. Under diminishing returns, supply price was less than marginal supply price, implying that the increase in the output of the individual firm would lead to increased costs for the industry as a whole (Pigou 1912, p 
Pigou

. 176).6
What did the above signify for the industry as a whole? The supply curve for the industry followed the laws of returns: Increased scale of production under diminishing returns increased the costs of production through external diseconomies, leading to an upward-sloping supply curve; the inverse applied to increasing returns.
In discussing the supply curve for the firm, Pigou did not mention Marshall's representative firm. But he did realize that the individual firm could not have internal economies at equilibrium, otherwise it would drive the competition out of the market and lead to monopoly. Stability required that external economies be "common to all the suppliers jointly" and that the firm 5A plane curve lies on a single plane. If the supply price of firm output were independent of other firms' prices, its supply curve could be drawn on a flat plane. But since a firm's supply price depends on other firms', the firm's supply curve can only be accurately represented in multiple dimensions and would be a curvilinear surface rather than a simple two-dimensional curve. Industry supply differs because, by assumption, in partial equilibrium, the prices of other industries' products are parameters. 6 itself be at a point beyond which it would experience diminishing returns (Pigou 1912, p. 177 ). This analysis did not, however, specify the shape of the supply curve for the individual firm. In the 1920s, the Marshallian treatment of the laws of returns was criticized heavily on various grounds. Clapham (1922) declared that the laws of returns were empty economic boxes, representing a logical/theoretical apparatus devoid of empirical content, precision, and clarity. Others repeated Young's (1913) concern with the accuracy of Pigou's policy conclusions with respect to decreasing and increasing cost industries (Knight 1924; Robertson 1924 ).7 However, everyone seemed to agree, explicitly or implicitly, that cost curves were U-shaped and supply curves upward sloping. Sraffa's (1926) seminal article showed that downward-sloping or upward-sloping industry supply curves violated the conditions necessary for a competitive industry studied in a partialequilibrium context. Perfect competition required that the demand for and the supply of a commodity be independent from each other and from the demand for and supply of other commodities. When conditions of decreasing or increasing costs were present, a change in the output of one industry introduced precisely such interdependence.
Sraffa's Criticisms
First, the Marshallian treatment assumed that increasing costs were due to the existence of a factor in limited supply (e.g., land). Increased industry output implied an increase in the price of this factor; this then implied a rise in the cost of production in other industries that used this factor. If their products were potential substitutes, the change in relative prices would affect the demand for the product of the original industry (Sraffa 1926, p. 539). Second, increasing returns faced similar problems. Internal economies were incompatible with perfect competition because they led to monopoly. A static framework required assuming away economies due to general economic progress. As a result, one had to focus on economies that were external to the firm but internal to the industry (hereafter referred to as external economies). Such economies were rare in reality, argued Sraffa, and thus so were "supply curves showing decreasing costs" (Sraffa 1926 , p. 540). The "cost of production of commodities produced competitively ... must be regarded as constant in respect of small variations in the quantity produced" (p. 541).
Sraffa's article sparked a debate about the shape of cost and supply curves. Although by the early 1930s, perfect competition was a familiar term and its prerequisites were well specified, no such consensus was yet reached over the shape of the cost and supply curves. The following two sections will discuss these debates about L-shaped and U-shaped cost curves and their implication for the slope of the industry supply curve.
Long-Run Cost and Supply Curves
L-Shaped Cost Curves
Pigou's Reaction. Six months after the publication of Sraffa's article, Pigou accepted his argument that diminishing returns required general-equilibrium analysis and were incompatible 7 For a comprehensive survey of this controversy, see Aslanbeigui (1996) . with perfect competition under partial equilibrium.8 In two articles, Pigou (1927 Pigou ( , 1928 spelled out the conditions for the existence of equilibrium in that framework. Events exogenous to the operation of an industry, for example, general technological changes, inventions, or changes in tastes, were assumed away. In addition, the scope of the analysis was necessarily and logically confined to "commodities which individually employ so small a proportion of each of the several factors of production that no practicable changes in the scale of their output could sensibly affect the relative values of these factors" (Pigou 1927, p. 192 However, Pigou did not rule out the existence of external economies. A change in the industry's scale of production could lead to the use of more productive techniques and "increased specialization among the makers of the machines used in the industry" (Pigou 1927, p. 195) .9 Therefore, the industry supply curve could slope downward and/or be horizontal. Where average cost for the industry declined (i.e., marginal cost was below the average cost), the supply curve would be the same as the average-cost curve since no industry could survive at prices that did not cover average costs.'0 Where marginal costs were constant, the averageand marginal-cost curves would be horizontal and coincide. In other words, the general form for the industry supply curve was a rectangular hyperbola (p. 197).
In 1928, Pigou turned his focus to the firm's cost curves. He concurred with Marshall that the firms in an industry were at different stages of their life-cycle. He, too, accepted the need to study the cost and supply conditions for a firm through the medium of a typical unit, which he chose to call the equilibrium firm, implying ... that there can exist some one firm, which, whenever the industry as a whole is in equilibrium, in the sense that it is producing a regular output... in response to a normal supply price ... will itself also individually be in equilibrium.... The conditions of the industry are compatible with the existence of such a firm; and the implications about these conditions, which, whether it in fact exists or not, would hold good if it did exist, must be valid. (Pigou 1928 , pp. 239-240) Unlike Marshall's representative firm, however, Pigou's equilibrium firm did not enjoy internal economies; it reached an optimum size, "trespass beyond which yields no further internal economies" (Pigou 1927, p. 195) . Its costs therefore declined for the initial ranges of output and became constant later. Pigou was one of the first economists to publish U-shaped cost curves for the firm; however, it was implicit in his diagrammatic analysis and discussion that the firm would not move beyond the lowest point of its average cost curve. Stable equilibrium for this 8 Pigou's acquiescence had been in the making for many years. In 1913, he had recognized the importance of interdependence between individual and market supply (demand) curves (Pigou 1913, p. 21) . In 1920, he had made explicit that, under partial-equilibrium conditions, each industry must be small enough so that an increase in its output did not appreciably affect the price of factors of production (Pigou 1920, p. 935). In 1924, in a response to Allyn Young, he had agreed that the increase in long-run costs due to diminishing returns could not be caused by technical diseconomies. Such diseconomies as rising factor prices were only pecuniary, involving income redistribution but not increased input requirements (Pigou 1924, p. 194) . Once Sraffa's article pulled all the above arguments together, Pigou agreed that increasing costs and, by implication, upward-sloping supply curves were incompatible with the Marshallian partialequilibrium, perfect-competition model. 9 Sraffa had objected that such economies were not very common empirically. For Pigou, an analytical study merely exposed the possibility of such economies (Pigou 1927, p. 196) . '0 Pigou (1912, p. 174) defined total cost to include interest or the opportunity cost of capital. firm dictated that the industry price be equal to its marginal and average costs (Pigou 1928, p.
243).11
In the absence of external economies, the equilibrium firm's output and size would be fixed, the firm always operating at the lowest point of its U-shaped average cost curve. Industry's output would have to be met by the entry of new firms or by the expansion of output of nonequilibrium firms. For firms with L-shaped cost curves, output was indeterminate. Because Pigou's analytical framework, following Marshall, allowed for heterogeneous, ever-changing firms, he was not concerned with this result. Instead, he focused on the concomitant stability of industry price. For Pigou, in the presence of external economies,12 the industry supply curve was downward sloping. As the industry expanded, the equilibrium firm's cost curves shifted, the firm would produce at the lowest point of its new average-cost curve, although its size might change (Pigou 1928 geneous costs across firms, the firm with the lowest costs would monopolize the industry. With identical costs, each producer could produce any amount at the equilibrium price (the minimum of the long-run average-cost curve), nothing below it, and unlimited quantities above it. In this case, the industry supply curve would not be definable; "it is impossible to indicate graphically the relationship between the long-run supply curves of individual concerns and the industry as a whole" (p. 211).
[I]n the long-run there would be a constant tendency toward overproduction, with consequent losses and a reaction toward underproduction. Actual long-run price and output would be unstable, but would oscillate above and below stable points of equilibrium price and equilibrium output. (p. 211)
Viner's discussion is vague. He appears to say that the industry supply curve cannot be defined, in light of firm behavior. However, the quote above addresses the stability of market equilibrium, not the shape of the supply curve; industry supply would be horizontal and therefore infinitely elastic, given uniform and horizontal long-run average cost curves for all firms. The problem that produces the instability is that perfectly elastic industry and firm supply cause an indeterminate division of industry output among firms. Therefore, firm output will be subject to swings that economists cannot accurately predict and market forces will not attenuate. The Financial factors could equally lead to economies and diseconomies of scale. Large firms could borrow at more advantageous interest rates from banks and by issuing stock to the general public. These economies would likely, though not necessarily, come to a halt at some point, however, since the leaders of larger firms would have to face the "cramping influence upon their enterprise" from the shareholders and others; "the autocracy which is the foundation of their efficiency" would be "confined and limited" (Robinson 1931 , pp. 59-60).
Marketing factors related to scale economies included the cost of buying (raw material, etc.) and the cost of selling the product. Larger firms could buy at discounted prices, hire expert buyers (Robinson 1931, p. 65), and/or maintain a separate marketing department (p. 67). Without providing any evidence or discussion, Robinson maintained that beyond some level these expenditures would increase "the more rapidly, the more rapidly the firm attempts to grow" (p. 79).
All firms would be subject to four types of fluctuations in the demand for their products:
permanent changes due to changes in tastes, cyclical variations due to general reductions in income, seasonal variations, and random changes "due to the failure of individual orders to combine in such a way that they form a single continuous stream" (Robinson 1931 Stigler introduced the firm first and foremost. He separated the short-run U-shaped cost curves from cost curves in the long run, the latter being an envelope of the many possible short-run cost curves. Unlike the short run, the long run was defined as a period in which the size of the plant could vary.
Like many before him, Stigler recognized that, under perfect competition, internal economies would be exhausted21 and the firm would reach a point of constant returns to scale.
However, beyond some size, the firm would face internal diseconomies of scale:
... the growth of a firm puts heavier and heavier burdens on the management. Quite aside from the difficult problem of expansion itself, large groups are much harder to coordinate than smaller units. For management, and control in general, inherently face a problem: the final authority to make decisions cannot be subdivided or delegated. Large units are, in fact, confronted by a dilemma. At one extreme all authority may be delegated. Then there will be no unity of policy or uniformity of performance. At the other extreme, all decisions may be made by a final center. This system involves bureaucracy in its worst form: "red tape," hopeless delay, decisions based on diluted memoranda. Between these two extremes the large firm attempts to steer a middle course, but it never achieves that compactness, flexibility, and singleness of purpose which are possessed by every well-managed medium-sized firm. The growing difficulty of coordination and decision-making eventually stops the growth of every firm. (Stigler 1942, p. 138) As is evident from the above quotation, Stigler replicated Austin Robinson's argumentswithout attribution-with a minor twist. In his hands, coordination failure translated into a fixed factor of production, the final authority or entrepreneur. Stigler did not address the possibilities that Robinson had identified whereby competitive firms could avoid these sources of rising costs (e.g., decentralization). Stigler assumed that "diseconomies of large-scale production set in soon enough to insure numerous firms and therefore competition" (Stigler 1942, p. 160) , implying that the long-run envelope of short-run average costs is also U-shaped, albeit flatter.
The firm would operate at the minimum point on this curve or be competed out of business. 
Partial General Equilibrium
After the 1920s, a consensus emerged that external economies and diseconomies could affect the costs of production of individual firms and industry. Stigler's synthesis of Viner's and Joan Robinson's views found that increased output of the industry increased factor prices and hence led to upward-sloping industry supply curves.
This argument, which is still being used in introductory and intermediate economics textbooks, fails to respond to Sraffa's criticism: It makes the demand for and the supply of industry output interdependent. Joan Robinson's argument rested on the existence of a fully employed economy where an increase in the demand for the output of one industry would have to be met with decreased supply of the products of another (and associated demand adjustments). This led to increased prices of factors of production more heavily used by the expanding industry.
To invoke the factor scarcity of macroeconomic full employment requires a general-equilibrium analysis: Factors available to the industry are scarce because they are in demand in all other sectors. What is the logical basis for taking some consequences of that general equilibrium into account but neglecting others? If long-run industry supply is upward sloping because of input-price increases, all prices-including prices of factors used in the production of substitutes and complements as well as output prices of goods using any of these inputs-will change. Since the demand for any product depends on the price of all others, any movement along that one industry supply curve is associated with widespread price changes that cause that industry's demand curve to shift and change slope in ways that are not obvious. Stigler suggested that demand would not be well defined. Without a definite demand curve, partial-equilibrium analysis becomes impossible if factor proportions and prices are the source of upward-sloping industry supply.
Discussion
We conclude with Sraffa that perfect competition under partial equilibrium is only logically consistent if the firm and industry supply curves are horizontal rather than upward sloping. However, this means that demand plays no role in price determination. For the long run, Marshall's scissors are replaced by the classical supply-side horizon for price determination.
This result makes the determination of factor incomes open-ended. Absent coordination failure and given reproducible plants, the counterpart of constant costs is a horizontal marginal product of labor equal to its average product in the long run. If competition forces the wage to equal that marginal product, there will be nothing left for capital and normal profits will be zero. However, since in that framework the marginal product of capital would also equal its average product, if competition forced the profit rate to the same level, there would be nothing left for wages. The functional distribution of income cannot be established a priori and cannot be determined by factors' marginal productivity. Such a range of indeterminacy for wages in the short run has long been accepted in the industrial-relations literature as the basis for wage setting by union negotiations (Kaufman 1993) . Our results suggest that the extension of this type of wage analysis to the long run for constant-cost firms may prove fruitful.
Moreover, horizontal cost curves make firm size indeterminate and therefore perfect competition precarious. This indeterminacy implies that, instead of rationally allocating resources among firms, the market cannot prevent ongoing interfirm conflict over market share and tendencies to under-and over-produce. By implication, factor employment will be equally unstable.
Those seeking to construct the microfoundations of macroeconomic fluctuations might do well to consider such a constant-cost model. Finally, since factor incomes and employment and firm output are indeterminate in theory, economists will have to use the inductive method and infer generalizations from empirical research, a method at odds with the positivist tradition. Notably, such induction dominates case research in the business disciplines (accounting, finance, production management, marketing), which typically treat constant production costs as the referent. Further research on the theory of the firm under constant costs might fruitfully cross these disciplinary boundaries.
Conclusion
The cost controversy (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) led to the articulation of the relationship between industry supply and firm costs under perfect competition. It shifted the analytical focus from the industry to the firm and led to the development of U-shaped cost curves. The Marshallian attention to the dynamic nature of the firm and to historical costs was supplanted by a conceptualization of the long run as composed of static, identical firms. The mathematical and diagrammatic analyses of costs became much easier and the theory more precise and standardized. However, we have shown that the standard model is still logically inconsistent.
To be consistent, partial-equilibrium analysis under perfect competition requires constant costs. Ironically, if firm size is indeterminate but large size is known to facilitate market power, constant-cost firms will arguably tend to grow beyond the size consistent with perfect competition. Then the only cost curves consistent with the partial-equilibrium analysis of perfect competition are likely to lead to its opposite: monopolistic competition or oligopoly.
